In 2022, the country faced its first-ever sovereign debt default. Sri Lanka’s debt crisis prompted deep interest in the country's debt situation. There was an urgent need for transparency but finding clear, reliable information on external debt isn’t easy, especially to the untrained eye—data is scattered across different sources and some data has to be obtained via special requests.
Debt.lk brings all the key facts on Sri Lanka's external debt—who the lenders are, how much has been borrowed, and where the money goes—into one easy-to-use platform. Our goal is to make Sri Lanka’s debt transparent, helping everyone from researchers to everyday citizens stay informed.
When I first began working on Sri Lanka’s public debt data, I had no idea where to look. It started back in 2017, when I sent a simple email to the Ministry of Finance asking, “How much do we owe, and to whom?” A few months later, I was directed to the External Resources Department (ERD). That’s when I first learned that Sri Lanka’s debt is managed by multiple institutions. The ERD handled foreign loans, while the Central Bank’s Public Debt Department took care of domestic borrowing, things like treasury bills and bonds. This was my first insight into how fragmented the system was.
When the ERD finally shared their data, it had broad categories: amounts owed to China, to sovereign bondholders, and others. But I was still confused. For instance, who exactly held the International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs)? I initially thought maybe countries like China owned them, but I soon realised that’s not how sovereign bonds work. They are traded in the secondary market, and the holders could be banks, investment funds, or other institutions.
Then came another layer of complexity: state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt. The ERD only tracked loans taken directly by the government. If a loan was taken by an SOE - the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission for the Lotus tower, for example - it didn’t appear in the ERD records. I realised this after spotting a small footnote stating, “SOE loans not included.”
In 2013, the government officially transferred some major loans, like those for Hambantota Port, Mattala Airport, and Norochcholai Power Plant, to the respective SOEs: the Port Authority, Airport and Aviation Services, and the Ceylon Electricity Board. On paper, this made government debt appear smaller. But the government was still repaying them using public funds. Thankfully, the ERD did acknowledge this when I asked, and they were able to provide historical data that had been removed from their current records.
This meant that we had to contact multiple agencies: ERD, Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, various SOEs, and even institutions like the National Water Supply and Drainage Board, which had taken loans directly from the China Development Bank to fully understand the details of Sri Lanka’s debt obligations. Some of this information was in annual reports, some in audit notes, and much of it had to be pieced together manually.
At the time, there was no single source that brought all this together. The Finance Ministry’s annual reports didn’t have all the loans. Some loan data, especially interest rates, grace periods, and terms, were scattered across reports. Even today, while the Quarterly Debt Bulletin helps with consistency, it doesn’t capture the full picture of SOE loans or detailed terms.
To make sense of this scattered data we first compiled a master list of known loans from all sources – Ministry of Finance annual reports, central bank reports and information obtained from various government institutions through Right To Information requests. Each loan entry was logged with as much detail as we could find: lender, borrower, year, amount, grace period, interest rate and repayment schedule. Over the years, as more documents were published and institutions gradually improved their disclosures, we continued to update and expand this database. Wherever possible, we cross-verified this information across multiple documents, including official records such as Ministry of Finance annual reports, ERD publications such as loan disbursement lists and other data provided by relevant authorities. This process allowed us to identify discrepancies, refine estimates, and build a more accurate picture of Sri Lanka’s public debt.
This is what led to us building debt.lk. It is a portal to bring all the scattered, fragmented pieces together in one place, and create a clear, verified picture of Sri Lanka’s external debt landscape. For a country navigating complex debt challenges, we believed that was the most important starting point.
- Umesh Moramudali, the main architect of debt.lk
Arutha was established to formalise the volunteer-driven economic civic education platform, Default LK, which emerged during Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic crisis. This crisis led to widespread misunderstanding and misinformation, highlighting the need for accurate and accessible information. Default LK responded by providing timely insights into the causes, consequences, and potential solutions to the crisis, ensuring that Sri Lankans could fully grasp the situation and empowering them with knowledge to prevent future crises.
Building on this foundation, Arutha's mission is to become the next-generation public policy and economics think tank in Sri Lanka, trusted by policymakers, the media, civil society, and the general public. Our work is rooted in nonpartisan, accurate research, with a particular focus on the critical areas of tax policy, national debt, and economic civic education. We aim to equip all Sri Lankans with the information they need to understand complex economic issues and engage meaningfully in shaping the nation’s future.
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